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IN THE GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION,
TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY IS STILL WINNING
Richard F. Connors, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Along with treason, bribery is the only other act for which the U.S.
Constitution expressly requires the removal of any and all civil officials.1
This explicit prohibition, when coupled with historical context, reveals
that the Framers of the Constitution recognized the pervasive dangers
of bribery.2 Even though the domestic economy at the time of
ratification was a minute fraction of what the U.S. economy has become,3
bribery represented such a threat to these newly-formed United States
that the Framers forewarned against it during the creation of our
nation.4 Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that these wise men had
the foresight to predict the rapid rate of economic globalization and the
resulting complexities of cross-border commerce.5
In many ways, legislation has kept pace with the rapid growth of
the international economy. Too often, however, a catalytic event is
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1 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4, cl. 1 (“The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
2 Id.; Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 342
(2009) (noting that substantiated intent pointed to the “[F]ramers of the Constitution
[seeing] the document as a structure to fight corruption”).
3 Max Roser, Economic Growth, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2013), https://ourworldin
data.org/economic-growth.
4 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 354 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(expressing concern that representatives would need safeguards against “the intrigues
of the ambitious, or the bribes of the rich”).
5 See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN DIALOGUE: THE FOUNDERS AND US 8 (Alfred A. Knopf 2018)
(declaring that, among other things, “the inherent inequalities of a globalized economy”
were “unforeseen and unprecedented” from the perspective of the founders).
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needed to compel meaningful change. For example, in response to the
Challenger catastrophe, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) revamped its decision-making process
regarding flight readiness.6 The United States increased its annual
counterterrorism spending sixteen times over in the years following the
September 11th attacks.7 In the wake of the Watergate scandal, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) discovered that over “400
U.S. companies had paid hundreds of millions of dollars” to foreign
public officials to obtain and maintain advantageous business
relationships.8 As a result, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), which broadly prohibited U.S. companies and
individuals from offering or paying bribes to foreign officials in an
attempt to influence political acts or business decisions.9
According to Stanley Sporkin, then-Director of the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement during the Watergate hearings, the creation and
subsequent adoption of the FCPA was somewhat of a happy accident.10
An informal investigation yielded “secret funds” that were used, among
other uses, to pay “bribes to high officials of foreign governments.”11
Shockingly, 117 of the United States’ Fortune 500 corporations engaged
in these transactions and disguised them within various “mislabeled”
accounts.12 Given what ultimately amounted to overwhelming proof of
corrupt cross-border activity, “[a] creative solution became absolutely
necessary.”13
6 Larry Prusak, 25 Years After Challenger, Has NASA’s Judgment Improved?, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Jan. 28, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/01/25-years-after-challenger-has.
7 THE STIMSON STUDY GRP. ON COUNTERTERRORISM SPENDING, COUNTERTERRORISM SPENDING:
PROTECTING AMERICA WHILE PROMOTING EFFICIENCIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY 5 (May 2018),
https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_
0.pdf.
8 CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. EXCH.
COMM’N, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2 (July 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1292051/download
[hereinafter
RESOURCE GUIDE].
9 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd).
10 See Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 269, 271–72
(1998) (“The FCPA was not the creation of some bureaucrat who, without provocation,
thought that this was a law that should be on the books. Instead, it came about as a
reaction to certain highly questionable activities . . . that became public as a result of
investigations . . . .”).
11 Id. at 272.
12 See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95–640, at 4 (1977).
13 Sporkin, supra note 10, at 272.
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The troubling revelation that U.S. companies were bribing foreign
officials to secure business and influence was the catalytic event needed
to prompt change to the country’s anti-corruption enforcement efforts.
Arguably, though, the United States is currently experiencing a second
catalytic event within this cross-border corruption context: the rapid
increase of enforcement actions and the consequential apportionment
of financial sanctions has revealed the fundamental weaknesses of the
United States’ anti-corruption efforts. By almost all measures, 2020 was
an especially noteworthy year of application, enforcement, and
imposition of sanctions for FCPA actions.14 The FCPA Units of the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC “set a record in terms of
corporate penalties collected in the U.S. [in 2020]. . . [with a] previous
high-water mark occurr[ing] in 2019.”15 The total value of calculable
settlement resolutions is estimated to be between $5 billion and $6.4
billion, but the methodologies underlying these calculations vary.16
Notably, these criminal penalties appear to be largely a product of
record-high sanctions and not a product of increased enforcement.17 By
reading between the lines, one can see that the purposes of the FCPA—

14 See Dylan Tokar, Foreign Bribery Enforcement on Track for Record-Breaking Year,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2020, 3:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/foreign-briberyenforcement-on-track-for-record-breaking-year-11607114397; Cuneyt A. Akay, FCPA
Year in Review 2020, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/fcpa-year-review-2020.
15 See Tokar, supra note 14.
16 Compare 2020 FCPA Enforcement Digest, LEXISNEXIS (Nov. 10, 2020), https://
internationalsales.lexisnexis.com/news-and-events/2020-fcpa-enforcement-digest,
with Harry Cassin, Getting to $6.4 Billion: 2020’s Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Ranked by Size, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 15, 2020), https://fcpablog.com/2020/12/15/gettingto-6-4-billion-2020s-corporate-fcpa-enforcement-actions-ranked-by-size/.
17 In fact, enforcement actions appeared to decrease from 2019 to 2020, while fines
and penalties increased during this same period. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act and Related Enforcement Actions: Chronological List, 2019,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions/2019 (last
updated Sept. 8, 2021) (listing 65 enforcement actions), and U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA
Cases: 2019, https://www.sec.gov/enforce/sec-enforcement-actions-fcpa-cases (last
updated Sept. 29, 2021) (listing 17 enforcement actions), with U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act and Related Enforcement Actions: Chronological List, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions/2020 (last
updated Dec. 22, 2021) (listing 37 enforcement actions), and U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA
Cases: 2020, https://www.sec.gov/enforce/sec-enforcement-actions-fcpa-cases (last
updated Sept. 29, 2021) (listing 8 enforcement actions); see also Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Clearinghouse, STAN. L. SCH., https://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-analytics.
html?tab=1 (last visited Dec. 29, 2021) (showing an upward trend of sanctions and a
downward trend of enforcement actions by DOJ and SEC from 2019 to 2020).
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namely, prevention and deterrence18—are not being fulfilled. The
increased application of the FCPA has publicly revealed the
shortcomings of the United States’ broader battle against international
corruption and transnational bribery.
At its simplest, the cost of bribery reveals itself at the intersection
of economics and deterrence. The FCPA crucially fails to account for the
need to deter both sides of a corrupt transaction. Currently, no legal
mechanism prevents or deters foreign officials from soliciting,
demanding, or extorting illicit payments from U.S. companies or
individuals.19 Only the bribe-payor, not the bribe recipient, is generally
at risk of prosecution under the FCPA.20 In practice, foreign public
officials can act with near impunity, save only superficial threats from
their governments.21
In response to this, scholars and legal
professionals have pushed for the expansion of the FCPA’s scope to
allow for the prosecution of both sides of a corrupt transaction instead
of solely targeting the payor of a bribe.22
While commentators once posited that the Biden administration
would not push for this change,23 the White House released a
memorandum that publicly pushes anti-corruption efforts to the
forefront of the United States’ national security strategy.24 Among the
myriad listed strategies sought, Section 2(d) of the memorandum
specifically contemplated addressing “the demand side of bribery.”25
18 The DOJ states that the FCPA “was enacted for the purpose of making it unlawful
for certain classes of persons and entities to make payments to foreign government
officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business.” See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practicesact (last visited Dec. 29, 2021). The FCPA was not enacted for the purpose of fundraising
for the government.
19 See discussion infra Part II and accompanying text regarding enforcement
limitations of the FCPA.
20 See id.
21 See discussion infra Section III.B and accompanying text regarding the tendency
for foreign governments to prosecute their own foreign officials.
22 See generally Lucinda A. Low, Sarah R. Lamoree, & John London, The Demand Side
of Transnational Bribery: Why Leveling the Playing Field on the Supply Side Isn’t Enough,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 563 (2015).
23 Steve Spiegelhalter & Paul Fitzsimmons, Looking Forward: Corporate Enforcement
in a Biden Administration, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.
corporatecomplianceinsights.com/corporate-enforcement-biden-administration/
(“Much of how the DOJ and SEC will enforce the FCPA is already baked in . . . .”).
24 Administration of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 2021 Memorandum on Establishing the
Fight Against Corruption as a Core United States National Security Interest, DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOCS. 1 (June 3, 2021).
25 Id.

CONNORS (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

1/12/22 11:17 AM

COMMENT

961

Through this memorandum, President Biden also ordered a
multifarious interagency review of anti-corruption processes spanning
enforcement and intelligence agencies alike.26
Pursuant to the memorandum, federal departments and agencies
conducted the requested review, and the White House released the “first
United States Strategy on Countering Corruption” in December of
2021.27 This renewed approach to combatting corruption reveals “five
mutually reinforcing pillars of work,” each of which include narrowed
“strategic objectives.”28 Notably, Strategic Objective 3.2 calls for
“updat[ing] tools available to hold corrupt actors accountable at home
and abroad” by “working with allies and partners on enacting legislation
criminalizing the demand side of bribery, and enforcing new and existing
laws, including in the countries where the bribery occurs.”29 With the
announcement of the Biden administration’s clear stance, this Comment
is well-positioned to offer suggestions as to exactly how the United
States can achieve the objectives of this strategy. This Comment will
also preemptively confront those who oppose expanding the United
States’ general anti-corruption efforts.
While all instances of accepting a bribe should eventually be made
illegal, this Comment argues that extorting a U.S. individual or entity
should be immediately criminalized under the FCPA. The overall
purpose of the FCPA cannot be wholly satisfied if foreign public officials
continually victimize U.S. individuals and entities. From a deterrence,
moralist, and protectionist perspective, the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provision has fallen behind international best practices. As a result of
such inadequacy, the United States is further aggravating the global fight
against international corruption and transnational bribery.
This Comment will provide a detailed evaluation of the FCPA’s
enforcement mechanisms to ultimately propose amendable measures
that would expand the FCPA’s reach to foreign public officials. Part II
will discuss the origin, evolution, and current framework of the FCPA.
This discussion will highlight both the tireless cost of international
corruption and the statutory gaps present within an ever-growing
international economy. Part III will address the often-cited criticisms of
expanding the reach of the FCPA. Section III.A provides an overview of
the United States’ current statutory framework to combat corruption
Id.
THE WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES STRATEGY ON COUNTERING CORRUPTION 4 (2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/United-States-Strategyon-Countering-Corruption.pdf.
28 Id. at 5.
29 Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
26
27
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and bribery. This overview will further emphasize the existing
prosecutorial gaps and show that the United States already recognizes
the culpability of the solicitation and extortion of illicit funds. Sections
III.B–C refute remaining criticisms.
Lastly, Part IV offers
recommendations to the United States’ general international anticorruption strategies—most of which rely on FCPA expansion.
The increased globalization of the international economy has led to
stronger coordination efforts between countries and the enforcement of
their respective anti-bribery laws.30 The FCPA, however, has not kept
pace with this rate of globalization. Arguably, more exacting legislation,
like the United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010, has surpassed the FCPA in
scope.31 In light of rapid globalization and of the increased awareness
of damaging international corruption, the overt demand of illicit
payments is a largely undisturbed side of illegal transactions that should
be prosecuted when viewed in the context of the United States’
perceived role as a global deterrent and moral guide.
II. THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
ANTIQUATED FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
The vast majority of modern-day corruption scholarship
unambiguously agrees that corruption damages the function and
integrity of the international economy. But this same scholarship
continues to implore for an investigation into the underlying causes of
corruption so society can more effectively fight against it.32 Professor
Zephyr Teachout has analyzed and synthesized five broad definitions of
corruption used throughout Supreme Court case law, which include
“criminal bribery, inequality, drowned voices, a dispirited public, and a
lack of integrity.”33 Ben W. Heineman, Jr. and Fritz Heimann describe
the tendency of corruption to “distort[] markets and competition,
Andrea D. Bontrager Unzicker, From Corruption to Cooperation: Globalization
Brings a Multilateral Agreement Against Foreign Bribery, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 655,
659–61 (2000) (arguing that “the process of globalization” is “the reason that a
multilateral agreement against international corruption now exists”).
31 Brigid Breslin, Doron F. Ezickson, & John C. Kocoras, The Bribery Act 2010: Raising
the Bar Above the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 362, 362–63 (2010), Thomson
Reuters (Legal) Limited.
32 15:2 ERIC BREIT ET AL., Critiquing Corruption: A Turn to Theory, EPHEMERA: THEORY
& POL. IN ORG. 319, 320 (2015) (“The corruption literature has broken important ground
for not only theoretical understandings of why corruption occurs and who it involves,
but also for the development of anti-corruption policies and efforts across the globe
. . . . [W]e argue that what tends to be neglected is an investigation into, and this
understanding of, the underlying causes and mechanisms of the phenomenon.”).
33 Teachout, supra note 2, at 387.
30
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breed[] cynicism among citizens, undermine[] the rule of law, damage[]
government legitimacy, and corrode[] the integrity of the private
sector.”34 Scholars and economists agree that corruption reduces
economic growth by diverting public resources from societal necessities
like education, healthcare, and infrastructure.35 Corruption threatens
government security and economic stability by directly and indirectly
encouraging criminal activity such as smuggling, drug trafficking, and
other seemingly permissible misconduct.36 Corruption is unfair and
anti-competitive because it severely disadvantages businesses that do
not, or cannot, succumb to extortion or afford to pay bribes.37
Corruption also undermines legal certainty in various business
transactions because many contracts formed based on corruption are
legally unenforceable.38
In the inaugural meeting on corruption, Secretary-General António
Guterres presented to the United Nations Security Council members
that, per estimates by the World Economic Forum, the “global cost of
corruption is at least $2.6 trillion, or 5 percent of the global gross
domestic product.”39 The White House approximates that number as
“between 2 and 5 percent [of] global gross domestic product.”40 In
addition, the World Bank has estimated that “businesses and individuals
pay more than $1 trillion in bribes every year.”41 As mentioned, this

Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, 85
FOREIGN AFFS. 75, 76 (2006).
35 See Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and Development, FIN. & DEV. 8
(Mar. 1998), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/gray.pdf
(noting that bribery usually “reduces the state’s ability to provide essential public
goods”).
36 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., FOREIGN AID IN THE NAT’L INT., PROMOTING FREEDOM, SECURITY,
AND OPPORTUNITY 40 (2002), https://rmportal.net/library/content/higherlevel_fani/
at_download/file; see also United States v. Ahsani, No. 4:19-cr-00147 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4,
2019), ECF No. 16 (noting that the executives who were involved in the bribery scheme
were also paid “kickback” payments).
37 See Gray & Kaufmann, supra note 35, at 8 (noting that bribery especially hurts
“small enterprises”).
38 See generally Kevin E. Davis, Contracts Procured Through Bribery of Public
Officials: Zero Tolerance Versus Proportional Liability, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1261,
1265 (2018).
39 Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Global Cost of Corruption at Least 5 Per Cent
of World Gross Domestic Product, Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Citing World
Economic Forum Data (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/
sc13493.doc.htm.
40 2021 Memorandum on Establishing the Fight Against Corruption as a Core United
States National Security Interest, supra note 24.
41 Press Release, U.N. Security Council, supra note 39.
34
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money represents financial potential, which should, in theory, be taxed
capital and directed towards societal necessities.42 Corruption
increases the cost and exacerbates the challenges of individuals and
entities doing business globally, which, in turn, deters foreign
investment—especially in developing countries.43
Simply put,
corruption plagues the very structure of the world’s international
political economy.
In 1977, the United States enacted the FCPA and subsequently
“became the first country in the world to prohibit the payment of bribes
to foreign public officials.”44
Facing increasing pressure from
corporations,45 Congress amended the FCPA in 1988 to add, among
other things, two affirmative defenses: the “local law” defense and the
“reasonable and bona fide business expenditure” defense.46 The “local
law” defense excuses otherwise questionable contributions when “the
payment was lawful under the foreign country’s written laws and
regulations at the time of the offense.”47 The “reasonable and bona fide
business expenditure” defense allows U.S. corporate entities to provide
“travel and lodging expenses to a foreign official” when the expenses
“are directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of
a company’s products or services, or are related to a company’s
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or
agency.”48
Alongside these amendments, Congress also requested that
President Ronald Reagan negotiate an international treaty with
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) to prohibit bribery in international business
See Gray & Kaufmann, supra note 35, at 8.
Brad Graham & Caleb Stroup, Does Anti-Bribery Enforcement Deter Foreign
Investment?, APPLIED ECON. LETTERS (May 11, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2447910.
44 Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States: Four Case Histories: Hearing
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Gov’tal Affs., 111th Cong. 8 (2010).
45 Sporkin, supra note 10, at 276 (“A good many of our corporations whined that
they were losing business to foreign corporations that not only were not precluded from
paying bribes to foreign officials but were encouraged to do so.”).
46 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102
Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (1988) [hereinafter Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988]. For more information on the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, see Adam
Fremantle & Sherman Katz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, 23
INT’L L. 755 (1989).
47 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 24.
48 Id.; see also Section 30A(c)(2)(A)–(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2).
42
43
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transactions among economic allies.49 Negotiations at the OECD
culminated in the creation of the Convention on Combatting Bribery of
Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (“Anti-Bribery
Convention”), which required participating parties to make it a crime to
bribe foreign officials.50 In 1998, Congress amended the FCPA for a
second and final time to conform to the requirements of the AntiBribery Convention.51 This final round of amendments expanded the
scope of the FCPA to: criminalize “payments made to secure ‘any
improper advantage;’ reach certain foreign persons who commit an act
in furtherance of a foreign bribe while in the United States;” include
public international organizations as within the definition of “foreign
official;” add an alternative jurisdictional nexus based on nationality;
and “apply criminal penalties to foreign nationals employed by or acting
as agents of U.S. companies.”52 Forty-four countries have ratified or
acceded to the Anti-Bribery Convention, with the United States
maintaining its status as a founding party.53 The 1998 amendments to
the FCPA represent the latest revision of the FCPA. To put this extensive
timeline into perspective, the first handheld MP3 player was introduced
to America in only 1998.54 Clearly, much has changed since then.
Generally, the current structure of the FCPA relies on two separate
but related enforcement mechanisms: the anti-bribery provision and
the accounting and internal controls provision.55 The FCPA’s antibribery provision prohibits U.S. persons—including natural persons

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, at § 5003(d) (“It is the sense of
the Congress that the President should pursue the negotiation of an international
agreement, among the members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development, to govern persons from those countries concerning acts prohibited with
respect to issuers and domestic concerns by the amendments made by this section.”).
50 See generally Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
51 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1988, Pub. L. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302 (1998).
52 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 3; see also S. Rep. No. 105-227, at 2–3 (1998).
53 OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATTING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUB. OFF. IN INT’L BUS.
TRANSACTIONS, RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF MAY 2018 (2018), http://www.oecd.org/daf/
anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf.
54 Ron Adner, From Walkman to iPod: What Music Tech Teaches Us About Innovation,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/
from-walkman-to-ipod-what-music-tech-teaches-us-about-innovation/253158/.
55 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78ff(a), 78m. The criminal enforcement following a
violation of the FCPA’s accounting and internal controls provision warrants a separate
analysis outside of the purpose of this Comment.
49
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within the United States,56 domestic concerns,57 and issuers58—from
making corrupt payments to foreign officials, foreign political parties or
candidates, or third-parties who will knowingly forward such corrupt
payment to aforementioned foreign official or entity to obtain or retain
business.59
The FCPA also applies to non-U.S. persons and foreign non-issuer
entities who have a specified jurisdictional connection.60 Specifically,
the 1998 amendments to the FCPA expanded its jurisdictional reach in
two important ways.61 First, a jurisdictional nexus can be established
through any direct or indirect act or engagement in the furtherance of a
corrupt payment while, or taking place, in the United States.62 This
nexus often targets those utilizing instrumentalities of interstate
commerce or the U.S. mail system to further a corrupt payment.63
Second, the 1998 amendments implemented a “nationality principle,”
which tied enforcement of the FCPA to U.S. companies and individuals
acting entirely outside the United States, regardless of whether said U.S.
companies or individuals utilize instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.64
To reiterate, the anti-bribery provision applies to both people and
payments. The FCPA applies to payments, offers, or promises to pay for
the purpose of corruptly:
(i) influencing any act or decision of a foreign official in his
official capacity, (ii) inducing a foreign official to do or omit to
do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, (iii)
securing any improper advantage; or (iv) inducing a foreign
official to use his influence with a foreign government or

See § 78dd-3.
See § 78dd-2(h)(1) (defining “domestic concern” as “any individual who is a
citizen, national, or resident of the United States [and] . . . any corporation, partnership,
association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole
proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is
organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or
commonwealth of the United States.”).
58 See §78c(a)(8) (“The term ‘issuer’ means any person who issues or proposes to
issue any security . . . .”).
59 See §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
60 See § 78dd-3 (territorial principle); see also § 78dd-2 (nationality principle).
61 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2
62 See § 78dd-3.
63 See §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3.
64 §§ 78dd-2(i)(1), 78dd-1(g)(1); see also International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1988, Pub. L. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
56
57
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instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or
decision of such government or instrumentality.65
The purpose of the payment must be that of corrupt intentions, which is
admittedly hard to decipher—but it is arguably no more difficult than
ascertaining any other criminal mens rea element of an offense.66 In
other words, the FCPA is not a statute premised on strict liability. There
are two available affirmative defenses.67 There is one statutory
exception, recognized as “facilitating or expediting payments.”68 This
exception applies only when a payment is made to further “the
performance of a routine governmental action,”69 like processing visas.
Additionally, the FCPA does not apply to cases of duress because the
requisite mens rea is absent from such a nonconsensual exchange.70 The
FCPA does recognize extortion as an affirmative defense, but proof of
duress is required.71 The 2020 Resource Guide to the FCPA explains that
duress constitutes “extortionate demands [made] under imminent
threat of physical harm.”72
At this point, it is important to note that the current statutory
framework of the FCPA has not been without praise for its success.
There is certainly merit behind the argument for leaving the FCPA as-is
in terms of its prosecutorial reach. For one, the FCPA has largely
succeeded in delegating anti-corruption enforcement efforts nationally
and internationally.73 Since the enactment of the FCPA in 1977, many
other countries have adopted their own anti-corruption legislation to

RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 11; see also §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (“The word ‘corruptly’ is used in order to make clear
that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to
misuse his official position . . . .”).
67 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c).
68 § 78dd-1(b).
69 Id.
70 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 27, 111 n.174.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 27; see also United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 n.31 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (“[A]n individual who is forced to make payment on threat of injury or death
would not be liable under the FCPA.”).
73 See Mike Koehler, Has the FCPA Been Successful in Achieving Its Objectives?, 2019
U. ILL. L. REV. 1267, 1275, 1299 (2019) (noting “‘hard’ enforcement metrics” and “‘soft’
enforcement metrics”); Nick Oberheiden, 10 Reasons Why FCPA Compliance Is Critically
Important for Businesses, NAT’L L. REV. (July 24, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/10-reasons-why-fcpa-compliance-critically-important-businesses (noting that
the FCPA compels corporate compliance).
65
66
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reduce bribery.74 The FCPA has also encouraged—and, in some ways,
mandated—corporate adherence to certain compliance guidelines,
which has improved the integrity of the U.S. economy and the
transparency of U.S. entities’ governance.75 Although difficult to
determine, some argue that the FCPA has been successful in leveling and
maintaining a fair economic playing field by encouraging cross-border
cooperation against international corruption76 and by preventing
additional barriers to economic entry for smaller businesses.77
Furthermore, the FCPA’s current structure does provide a means to
prosecute U.S. persons and issuers who are located outside of the United
States.78 The current framework of the FCPA also provides a means to
pursue and prosecute foreign officials who utilize a recognized
jurisdictional nexus.79
As it stands, the FCPA’s current enforcement mechanisms fail to
provide for the means to pursue or prosecute foreign officials who
extort or demand bribes in exchange for economic access or other
favorable treatment. This appears to be by design: the Fifth Circuit
opined that “Congress knew it had the power to reach foreign officials
in many cases, and yet declined to exercise that power.”80 Congress’s
intent may have been acceptable during the FCPA’s infancy when
corporations’ needs conflicted with the needs of economic integrity,81
but this plausible intention is not acceptable now.

74 DAVID KENNEDY & DAN DANIELSEN, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., BUSTING BRIBERY: SUSTAINING THE
GLOBAL MOMENTUM OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 54 n.9 (2011).
75 See Sharon Oded, Trumping Recidivism: Assessing the FCPA Corporate Enforcement
Policy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 135, 138 (2018) (noting that additional corporate
incentives aimed at compelling compliance led to an increase in voluntary selfreporting).
76 Luay Al-Khatteeb & Omar Al Saadoon, Leveling the Transnational Playing Field,
BROOKINGS INST. (July 10, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/leveling-thetransnational-playing-field/.
77 Rebecca L. Perlman & Alan O. Sykes, The Political Economy of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: An Exploratory Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 153, 171–72 (2017).
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (nationality principle); see also infra Section III.A.
79 See § 78dd-3 (territorial principle); see also infra Section III.A.
80 United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 640,
at 12 n.3 (1977)).
81 Leah M. Trzcinski, The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on Emerging
Markets: Company Decision-Making in a Regulation World, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1201,
1209 (2013) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 916 (1988) (Conf. Rep.)) (“While taking a
bold moral stance to combat bribery globally might be a good public relations move,
Congress was sensitive to complaints from U.S. businesses that were operating at a
disadvantage internationally.”).

CONNORS (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

1/12/22 11:17 AM

COMMENT

969

The FCPA expansion has been a point of discussion across several
industries and political administrations for successive generations. In
his Note titled Increasing Accountability for Demand-Side Bribery in
International Business Transactions, Garen S. Marshall justifiably
stresses that “[a] strategy that only targets the supply-side will not be
successful if there are both alternative sources of supply and a general
lack of repercussions for the actively soliciting bribe-taker.”82 Others
have worked to define every possible point of origin of a bribe, hoping
that such illumination will have the effect of increased enforcement
efforts against any and all demand. One such resounding voice has been
Professor Joseph W. Yockey, who similarly argues for the regulatory
expansion into criminal enforcement of both bribe solicitation and
extortion.83 As a result of failing to target both sides of an illicit
transaction, the FCPA may go so far as to incidentally incentivize foreign
officials to demand bribes from U.S. entities and individuals because of
the near-nonexistent risk of facing punishment for such extortion
attempts.
Realizing the practical difficulties inherent in broadly amending
the FCPA to prohibit the acceptance of a bribe, the recognition and
subsequent criminalization of economic extortion would be sufficient to
deter the demand-side of bribery and help the United States fall in line
with international standards. Currently, the statutory framework set
forth by the FCPA to combat bribery fails to do so.
III. ADDRESSING THE PERCEIVED CHALLENGES TO AMENDING THE FCPA AND
PROSECUTING FOREIGN EXTORTIONISTS
Unsurprisingly, there is stark opposition to the idea of amending
the structure of the FCPA’s enforcement power. Political scholars and
international economists alike have decried efforts to fill this perceived
gap in the FCPA.84 Thomas Firestone and Maria Piontovska, while
Garen S. Marshall, Note, Increasing Accountability for Demand-Side Bribery in
International Business Transactions, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1283, 1301 (2014).
83 See Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
781, 795–96 (2011) (quoting James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the
Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1699 (1993)).
84 See generally Michael Peterson, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Should the Bribery Act 2010 Be a Guideline?, 12 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 417, 431 (2013)
(arguing that the FCPA should not be amended to mirror the [UK] Bribery Act [of]
2010”); Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, When Is a Bribe Not a Bribe? A Re-Examination of
the FCPA in Light of Business Reality, 23 IND. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 111, 154 (2013)
(concluding that “[a]mending the FCPA would be a fruitless and quixotic exercise in this
political climate” and suggesting that the DOJ should instead “issue comprehensive
guidelines” to clarify the current statute).
82
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arguing for such amendments, have succinctly captured the most oftencited criticisms:
(1) the fact that such cases can be prosecuted under other
statutes, such as money laundering and wire fraud, (2) the
greater interest of the bribe-taker’s government in
prosecuting the passive side of the offense, (3) the possible
political fallout that could result from criminally charging
foreign government officials for bribe-taking, and (4) the
jurisdictional challenges of bringing such cases.85
For the purpose of this Comment, it is important to note that the idea of
“passive bribery” is not, and should not be, indicative of a peaceful
acceptance of illicit payment.86 As Professor Matthew Stephenson
articulated, the term “passive bribery” belittles the sense of culpability
behind those demanding and accepting bribes.87 Nonetheless, this
second criticism to expanding the FCPA still exists: a foreign
government may be better positioned to prosecute its foreign officials
for engaging in extortion. Addressed individually below, these
criticisms alone are not significant enough to support a refusal to
recognize economic extortion as a criminal offense under the FCPA.
A. The Current Legal Mechanisms Available to Combat Corruption
and Bribery
Perhaps the loudest criticism against amending the FCPA, or
amending other anti-bribery statutes, finds itself in the argument that
foreign officials can be prosecuted under other statutes, thus making
any amendment unnecessary or redundant.88 Within the context of this
Comment, this criticism is unsubstantiated. Admittedly, the United
States has many anti-corruption statutes that work to eliminate private85 Thomas Firestone & Maria Piontkovska, Two to Tango: Attacking the Demand Side
of Bribery, AM. INT. (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/
12/17/two-to-tango-attacking-the-demand-side-of-bribery/; see also Blake Puckett,
Clans and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Individualized Corruption Prosecution in
Situations of Systemic Corruption, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 815, 826 (2010) (“Perhaps the
greatest immediate challenges to prosecuting foreign officials are the legal problems of
sovereign immunity and achieving jurisdiction by U.S. courts.”).
86 The OECD defines “passive bribery” as “the offence committed by the official
receiving the bribe.” See, e.g., OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms, Passive Bribery,
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7205 (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
87 Matthew Stephenson, An Almost Entirely Trivial Complaint About Terminology:
Can We Please Retire the Term “Passive Bribery”?, GLOB. ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Aug. 27,
2019), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2019/08/27/an-almost-entirely-trivialcomplaint-about-terminology-can-we-please-retire-the-term-passive-bribery/.
88 Firestone & Piontkovska, supra note 85.
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to-public domestic bribery,89 private-to-private bribery,90 and privateto-public foreign bribery.91 And while it is true that these statutes
provide for federal prosecution of public corruption,92 virtually all of the
statutes proffered to combat bribery do not do so by criminalizing the
economic extortion of U.S. individuals or entities by foreign public
officials.93 In fact, the Supreme Court has affirmed that foreign officials
“could not be charged with violating the FCPA itself, since the [FCPA]
does not criminalize the receipt of a bribe by a foreign official.”94
Moreover, the currently available statutes aimed at combatting
corruption and bribery require varying levels of proof. Thus, the
current statutory framework yields unjustifiable gaps in the federal
government’s ability to deter and prosecute bribery. After all, when
there is an unabated demand, there will always be a supply.
In 1946, Congress enacted the Hobbs Act, which criminalized the
attempt or conspiracy to rob, extort, or commit physical violence against
any person or property in order to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce
or the movement of any article or commodity within commerce.95 The
Hobbs Act is predominantly used against state and local officials
because more specific federal statutes deal with bribery of federal
officials96—like 18 U.S.C. § 201, discussed below, which is colloquially
referred to as the domestic bribery statute.97
The Hobbs Act, known for its enforcement capabilities against
public corruption and commercial disputes,98 broadly proscribes
against two types of crime: robbery and extortion.99 As the term
suggests, “robbery” refers to the “unlawful taking or obtaining of
See 18 U.S.C. § 201.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 1341, 1343.
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd.
92 See discussion infra Section III.A.
93 See id.
94 United States v. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116, 117 (N.D. Tex. 1990), aff’d United
States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 831 (5th Cir. 1991) (“We hold that foreign officials may
not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to violate the FCPA.”).
95 § 1951(a).
96 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 283–84, 290 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
97 See Mike Koehler, The Uncomfortable Truths and Double Standards of Bribery
Enforcement, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 525 (2015) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 201 as the “domestic
bribery statute” throughout).
98 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45395, ROBBERY, EXTORTION, AND BRIBERY IN
ONE PLACE: A LEGAL OVERVIEW OF THE HOBBS ACT (Nov. 6, 2018), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R45395.pdf.
99 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1)–(2).
89
90
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personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against
his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of
injury . . . .”100 The term “extortion,” however, means the “obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right.”101 The threat of violence requirement is similar to the FCPA’s
affirmative defense of duress, whereby both avenues of prosecution (or
lack of, in the case of the FCPA) would not cover economic extortion.102
Put differently, the Hobbs Act does not offer the use of economic
extortion as a prosecution tool because its definition of extortion
requires what the FCPA excludes from prosecution: threats of physical
violence or actual physical violence. Even more generally, the Hobbs Act
does not narrow the perceived gaps of the FCPA: the Hobbs Act does not
explicitly criminalize paying a bribe, and while it does criminalize
accepting a bribe, such acceptance must be prompted by physical
threats of, or actual, violence.
In 1961, Congress enacted the Travel Act, a federal statute that
criminalizes anyone who “travels in interstate or foreign commerce or
uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with
intent to” distribute the proceeds of unlawful activity, commit unlawful
violent acts to further unlawful activity, or otherwise “promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facilitate” said unlawful activity.103 Importantly,
the statute defines “unlawful activity” as, among other things, “extortion
[or] bribery . . . in violation of the laws of the State in which committed
or of the United States.”104 In other words, the Travel Act allows the
government to bring a state bribery charge in federal court if a
jurisdictional nexus exists. As a result, there must be a territorial
connection to the state where the unlawful activity occurs—for
example, conducting an intrastate telephone call to further a bribery
scheme. By itself, the Travel Act can only prosecute domestic actions
that violate the laws of the state where the action occurs. From an
international perspective, the Travel Act can only act as a complement
to other violations, such as a violation of the FCPA.105 Due to the
§ 1951(b)(1).
§ 1951(b)(2).
102 Compare RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 27–28, with § 1951(b)(1).
103 § 1952(a).
104 § 1952(b).
105 See United States v. Harder, 163 F. Supp. 3d 732, 743–44 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 15, 2015);
see also Stanley Foodman, Violating the FCPA May Trigger Other U.S. Laws Such as the
Travel Act, JD SUPRA (Sept. 4, 2010), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/violating-thefcpa-may-trigger-other-u-86511/.
100
101
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jurisdictional nexus requirement, which already exists ad nauseam in
the FCPA, the Travel Act is somewhat redundant when utilized in light
of the FCPA’s reach and only comes into play in this context when a
foreign public official travels to the United States, or utilizes a domestic
facility, to further corruption.
In 1962, Congress adopted 18 U.S.C. § 201—the domestic bribery
statute.106 This statute criminalizes, directly or indirectly, corruptly
giving, offering, or promising “anything of value to any public official”
with intent to “influence any official act,” influence any public official to
commit fraud or influence any public official to avoid an action that
would be a violation of a lawful duty.107 In this sense, a “public official”
includes officers and employees of the U.S. federal government.108 A
“public official” also broadly encompasses those who occupy positions
of public trust with official federal responsibilities, whether or not they
are formal employees or informal contractors.109 Notably, the statute
targets both those who give bribes and those who receive bribes, but the
narrowness of “public official” only makes this law enforceable against
U.S. public officials.110 While this criminal statute is relatively
inadequate in combatting foreign corruption, it does reveal that
Congress recognizes the criminal culpability of those who demand,
receive, and accept a bribe.111
Perhaps the most pointed criticism regarding the nonexistence of
this statutory gap comes from the current power of federal mail fraud
and wire fraud statutes. Generally, an individual’s use of domestic mail,
wires, or interstate commerce facilities during, or for the purpose of
furthering, a corruption scheme implicates two separate statutes: the
mail fraud statute112 and the wire fraud statute.113 These statutes
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)–(e).
§ 201(b).
108 § 201(a)(1) (“[T]he term ‘public official’ means Member of Congress, Delegate, or
Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official has qualified, or an officer or
employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department,
agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any
official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of
Government, or a juror.”).
109 Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984) (“[T]he proper inquiry is . . .
whether the person occupies a position of public trust with official federal
responsibilities. Persons who hold such positions are public officials within the meaning
of § 201 and liable for prosecution under the federal bribery statute.”).
110 § 201(b)(2)–(4).
111 § 201(b)(2).
112 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
113 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
106
107
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broadly criminalize the use of the domestic mail system, wire system,
phone, internet, or interstate commerce facilities to execute a “scheme
or artifice to defraud.”114 While the federal mail fraud and wire fraud
statutes are not explicitly extraterritorial,115 the DOJ has utilized
statutes to enforce anti-corruption efforts against foreign individuals
and entities who would otherwise be outside the reach of the FCPA.116
These statutes are powerful tools that often succeed in prosecuting the
bribery or attempted bribery of both domestic and foreign public
officials whose illicit activity is grounded in a domestic connection, like
using a U.S. financial institution to transfer money.117 It is important to
note, however, that Congress did not enact these statutes for the sole
purpose of combatting transnational bribery.118 As a result, these
statutes all require the existence of additional elements that may not be
present in ordinary bribery cases. For example, the mens rea element
required for the application of these statutes limits action against those
who “intend[] to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud.”119 Neither
extortion nor bribery requires an intent to defraud,120 so the present
prosecutorial gap persists within the FCPA because the mens rea
requirement and the territorial-nexus requirement pose barriers for the
prosecution of foreign officials and entities.
In sum, the FCPA’s unwritten weaknesses are apparent in several
contexts. These weaknesses are arguably most apparent, though, in
what other anti-corruption and anti-bribery legislation fail to
114 See §§ 1341, 1343; see also United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1994)
(“The wire fraud statute . . . is identical to the mail fraud statute except it speaks of
communications transmitted by wire.”); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358
(1987) (construing that the statute applies to any act “designed to defraud by
representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future”).
115 See Bascunan v. Elsaca, 927 F.3d 108, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2019).
116 See id. at 123 (holding that “the mail and wire fraud statutes do not give way
simply because the alleged fraudster was located outside of the United States”); see also
United States v. Napout, 963 F.3d 163, 181 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding sufficient domestic
connection when defendants accepted bribes that flowed through U.S. financial
institutions).
117 Christopher M. Matthews, Prosecutors Broadly Use Mail-Fraud, Wire Fraud
Statutes, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/prosecutorsbroadly-use-mail-fraud-wire-fraud-statutes-1433870788.
118 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41930, MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.everycrsreport.com/
files/20190211_R41930_0af1a4b3dbc5d40b0bef8f41ceae62156abe6210.pdf
(“The
mail and wire fraud statutes clearly protect against deprivations of tangible property.”).
119 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
120 See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd).
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accomplish. The FCPA’s criminalization of paying money for foreign
influence is limited to companies in the United States (issuers),121
individuals with U.S. citizenship and companies organized under U.S.
law (domestic concerns),122 and foreign individuals and foreign entities
who are within the territory of the United States when the illicit
transaction takes place (jurisdictional nexus).123 The Hobbs Act
criminalizes the extortion of money by public officials—but extortion in
this instance requires physical violence or the threat of physical
violence, and the Hobbs Act does not recognize economic extortion.124
The Travel Act criminalizes foreign individuals who travel to the United
States to engage in corruption schemes or bribery.125 The wire fraud
and mail fraud statutes allow the United States to pursue and prosecute
foreign officials who utilize U.S. channels to further corrupt activities
and corrupt payments, but the mens rea requirement may make it
increasingly difficult to apply these statutes to cases involving bribery
or extortion.126 As such, there is no enforcement mechanism currently
available that would deter, or altogether prevent, a foreign official from
extorting an illicit payment from a U.S. individual or entity before
allowing entry into a foreign market, economy, or country.
B. The Feasibility of Foreign Governments to Prosecute Their Own
Officials Who Solicit, Extort, Demand, or Accept Bribes
Many countries are ill-equipped to prosecute their public officials
for corruption and bribery. Consequently, the United States must be
careful to avoid misplacing its trust in a foreign government’s proclivity
to prosecute one of their own public officials. A recent study by the
OECD found that public officials’ home countries sanction or prosecute
their own in only 20 percent of uncovered bribery schemes involving
acceptance or demand.127 Developing countries, with an emphasis on
kleptocracies,128 are more likely to turn a blind eye to such uncovered

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78c(a)(8).
See § 78dd-2(h)(1).
123 See § 78dd-3 (territorial principle); see also § 78dd-2 (nationality principle).
124 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
125 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)–(b).
126 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
127 OECD, Foreign Bribery Enforcement: What Happens to the Public Officials on the
Receiving End?, (Dec. 11, 2018), www.oecd.org/corruption/foreign-briberyenforcement-what-happens-to-the-public-officials-on-the-receiving-end.htm.
128 Alexander Cooley, John Heathershaw & J.C. Sharman, The Rise of Kleptocracy:
Laundering Cash, Whitewashing Reputations, 29 J. OF DEMOCRACY 35, 49 (2018) (noting
that “[k]leptocracy depends heavily on the partial and selective use of the law . . . .”).
121
122
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corruption. This informal nepotism possibly stems from a country’s
desire to maintain a reputation of economic integrity.
In her publication, Sara C. Sàenz justifiably opines that “the worse
a country is at prosecuting bribery on its own, the more an FCPA case . . .
looks like legal imperialism rather than compliance with an
international expectation of combatting bribery.”129 It may indeed be
the case that many countries—especially those not allied with the
United States—may resist prosecuting their foreign officials for
extorting illicit funds from U.S. individuals and entities simply because
they object to the American interference. It is important to point out
that the FCPA does somewhat fall within the interpretation of what
some would label as ‘soft imperialism.’130 The FCPA is supposed to be,
and has been largely successful in, pushing for change in other countries.
The United States is a powerful presence, and the pressure put on nonabiding countries is not insignificant.
While the desire for a foreign country to maintain their respective
reputation of economic integrity is related to the United States’ desire
to maintain political alliances, the United States has not backed away
from denouncing illegal actions and should not look to do so now
because of the risk of creating political tension.131 While certainly
thought-provoking, this argument is grounded in hypocrisy because the
United States already has other criminal statutes that allow
enforcement agencies to target foreign officials in other situations.132 In
fact, the United States has not hesitated to charge and prosecute foreign
officials and foreign nationals with wire fraud and bribery,133 even while

129 Sara C. Sàenz, Explaining International Variance in Foreign Bribery Prosecution: A
Comparative Case Study, 26 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 269, 294 (2015).
130 See generally Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature
Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 223, 227 (1999) (discussing
potential problems that arise from imposing “alien values”).
131 See Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and Domestic
Strategy, 103 VA. L. REV. 1611, 1620 (2017) (noting that “the political costs of bringing
these [FCPA] cases can overwhelm the benefits”).
132 Many of these criminal statutes include, but are not limited to, those discussed in
Section III.A, as well as others like the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and the
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020.
133 See United States v. Lazarenko, 564 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (focusing on
charges of money laundering and bribery). It is important to note that the charges
against Lazarenko were rendered prior to the amendment of the Patriot Act, where the
understood difference between extortion and bribery was not yet judicially clarified.
Interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit recently took note that then-Ukrainian law “did
not require violence as an element” of extortion. See United States v. Chi, 936 F.3d 888,
894 (9th Cir. 2019).
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diplomatic relations were imperfect at the time of prosecution.134 As far
as one can tell, the enforcement of statutes like the wire fraud and mail
fraud statutes is not often discouraged for fear of political blowback.
Furthermore, some foreign countries may perceive bribery as a
form of foreign investment and would not actively seek to deter the
demand or receipt of bribery.135 To be sure, numerous studies have
found that increased enforcement of the FCPA not only increases the
costs associated with U.S. corporate entities doing business in foreign
countries but also broadly discourages and decreases foreign
investment.136 But to argue against amending the FCPA, or to argue
against its current reach because it discourages foreign investment, is
somewhat of a hollow stance to take because this specific argument goes
directly towards describing the very purpose of the FCPA. From both an
economic and a societal perspective, the FCPA represents Congress’s
decision to forgo some (hopefully negligible) amount of profit,
investment, or economic activity, to have and uphold certain coveted
moral and economic standards.
C. The Legitimacy of the Extradition Requirement for Prosecuting
Foreign Officials
Lastly, some experts argue that an indictment of a foreign official
without accompanying extradition is largely a waste of law enforcement
resources.137 But the allegedly symbolic act of indicting a foreign official
does have practical implications that may play a large role in deterring
134 In 2009, Ukraine–U.S. relations were not perfect. See Interfax-Ukraine, Crimean
Parliament Votes Against Opening U.S. Diplomatic Post, KYIVPOST (Feb. 18, 2009),
https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/crimean-parliamentvotes-against-opening-us-diplom-35722.html?cn-reloaded=1.
135 OECD, Is Foreign Bribery an Attractive Investment in Some Countries?, in OECD
BUSINESS AND FINANCE OUTLOOK 208 (2016), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/
BFO-2016-Ch7-Bribery.pdf.
136 Brad Graham & Caleb Stroup, Does Anti-Bribery Enforcement Deter Foreign
Investment?, in APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS 5-7 (May 11, 2015), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2447910 (“[A]n FCPA enforcement activity is associated with a subsequent 40
percent reduction in the incidence of U.S. cross-border acquisitions of targets
headquartered in that country. U.S. firms are thus significantly less likely to acquire
foreign targets in countries that have been previously targeted by FCPA enforcement,
consistent with the view that anti-bribery enforcement actions raise the cost of doing
business for U.S. firms . . . .”); see also James R. Hines, Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery
and American Business After 1977, 9-11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
5266, 1995) (finding that “American [foreign direct investment] grew more rapidly after
1977 in the less-corrupt countries . . .” than in the corrupt countries).
137 See generally Jack Goldsmith & Robert D. Williams, The Failure of the United States’
Chinese-Hacking Indictment Strategy, LAWFARE (Dec. 28, 2018), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/failure-united-states-chinese-hacking-indictment-strategy.
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undesirable future conduct. A U.S. indictment against a foreign official
undoubtedly carries weight that transcends national borders.
Individuals and businesses will likely be more hesitant to do business
with such a foreign official for fear of being associated with
corruption.138 A U.S. indictment could make it difficult for a foreign
official to travel across borders.139 A U.S. indictment would also
pressure foreign governments to take action or bring domestic charges
against those who demand bribes.140 While it would be undoubtedly
more effective from a deterrence perspective to extradite foreign
officials who extort from U.S. individuals and entities, the geopolitical
repercussions alone would likely deter enforcement of such a farreaching and arguably imperialistic law. Additionally, indictment
absent extradition would likely benefit the image of the DOJ’s
enforcement powers because such even-handed enforcement would be
perceived as fair and just.
The FCPA is not, and Congress never intended it to be, a global law
from an enforcement-capability perspective. In fact, the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”), the “only legally binding
universal anti-corruption instrument,”141 appears to recognize the need
for flexibility regarding extradition when corruption is found spanning
international borders.142 Under Chapter IV, Articles 43-49, States
Parties are obliged to “cooperate with one another in every aspect of the
fight against corruption, including prevention, investigation, and the
prosecution of offenders. Countries are bound by the convention to
render specific forms of mutual legal assistance in gather and
transferring evidence for use in court, to extradite offenders.”143 While
opinions differ as to whether this standard of cooperation is flexible in
practice, its flexibility is bolstered when read in conjunction with Article
16-2, which states that:

138 See John P. Carlin, Detect, Disrupt, Deter: A Whole-of-Government Approach to
National Security Cyber Threats, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 391, 420 (2016) (discussing
importance and overall consequences of issuing indictments).
139 See id.; see also Firestone & Piontkovska, supra note 85.
140 Id.
141 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
142 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION, G.A.
Res. 58/4 of 31 Oct. 2003, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/
Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf [hereinafter UNCAC].
143 Convention Highlights: International Cooperation, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/corruption/convention-highlights.html (last visited
Dec. 29, 2021); see also UNCAC, supra note 142, at 30–33.
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Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal
offence, when committed intentionally, the solicitation or
acceptance by a foreign public official or an official of a public
international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person
or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in
the exercise of his or her official duties.144
Admittedly, the notion of requiring States Parties to “consider” adopting
legislation that criminalizes the solicitation or acceptance of illicit
payments is relatively useless in a geopolitical sense. When read in
conjunction with Articles 43-49, mandated legal cooperation to enforce
extradition becomes less of a reality when the legal framework that
would prompt extradition is optional.
Thus, it appears that
international standards are satisfied with acting on the offensive
without the absolute need to carry out coordinated extraditions across
borders.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND REFUTATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES’ BATTLE
AGAINST FOREIGN BRIBERY AND ECONOMIC EXTORTION
To be effective, or to be seen as successful, the FCPA does not have
to stop every single act of induced influence or reach every illegal
payment. Instead, the analysis of whether the FCPA is effective depends
on if the FCPA prevents enough of the specifically targeted behavior to
overcome the costs of the potential crime. This goes for the enforcement
of most criminal laws—it just so happens that the cost of transnational
bribery is so high that the United States needs to take a stronger stance
on preventing it. To quote Senator Amy Klobuchar: the purpose of the
FCPA “is not just to punish bad actors after a violation is committed, but
rather to prohibit actions from happening in the first place.”145 In saying
so, Senator Klobuchar stresses the importance and necessity of general
deterrence.146 This Comment suggests several plausible steps to
improve the United States’ overall effectiveness in combatting
international corruption and transnational bribery.
Each
recommendation is offered in light of the Biden administration’s recent
broad anticorruption strategy,147 with the goal of providing lawful
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010)
(statement of Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)).
146 Id.
147 See UNITED STATES STRATEGY ON COUNTERING CORRUPTION, supra note 27.
144
145
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mechanisms for prosecuting foreign public officials who extort U.S.
individuals and businesses through economic pressure.
As argued throughout this Comment, the first suggestion is to
amend the FCPA to recognize economic extortion as a criminal offense.
The recognition of economic extortion would effectively close the
existing gap in the current structure of the FCPA by allowing the pursuit
and prosecution of foreign public officials who demand payment in
exchange for entry into their respective market, economy, or country.
As discussed, the present framework of the FCPA does not prevent
foreign public officials from making such extortionate demands.
Statutes that would otherwise prevent this are noticeably absent from
the federal government’s arsenal of prosecutorial tools. Complaints
regarding the lack of opportunity to extradite could be met with
counterarguments claiming that there is not a need for one; what’s
more, extradition may indeed be possible with the establishment of
economic extortion as a criminal offense, an additional jurisdictional
connection. And while such corrupt action would, in theory, be better
left for the country in which it takes place to denounce, the fight against
international corruption must be met with a consolidated effort that
spans nations. The global problem of corruption and bribery requires a
solution that actively and aggressively targets both sides of the
transaction.
Challenges to this proposed amendment present themselves in the
nuances of defining economic extortion. In light of 18 U.S.C. § 201’s
criminalization of accepting a bribe, there is no question that the United
States recognizes the criminal culpability of those who overtly demand
or otherwise accept illicit payments. However, the United States
decided to exempt foreign officials who commit this already-recognized
culpable act.148 With that recognition and admission in place, a simple
solution may be found by codifying the elements of economic extortion
within the statutory text of the FCPA. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has established that economic extortion requires (1) a threat of
economic harm, (2) made with the purpose of obtaining money from the
victim, (3) which would put the victim in reasonable fear of economic
harm.149 The codification of this offense would effectively expand the
FCPA’s reach to foreign public officials and foreign entities who threaten
difficulty or inconvenience. Most economists would agree that the
removal of corrupt actors from largely free marketplaces would yield
148 United States v. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116, 117 (N.D. Tex. 1990), aff’d United
States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991).
149 See United States v. Marsh, 26 F.3d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing United
States v. Greger, 716 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1984)).
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benefits to such marketplaces—as such, this codification would be a
step in the right direction in doing so.
More broadly, the recognition and criminalization of soliciting,
demanding, extorting, or accepting a bribe would largely be
accomplished by adopting and ratifying the Foreign Extortion
Prevention Act (“FEPA”).150 The FEPA would permit the prosecution of
foreign officials who demand or accept bribes in exchange for fulfilling,
disregarding, or violating of their official duties.151 The bill proposes
amending 18 U.S.C. § 201 by adopting the term “foreign official” and
criminalizing a foreign official who “corruptly demands, seeks, receives,
accepts, or agrees to receive or accept” bribes.152 This bill was
introduced on August 2, 2019,153 but it did not receive a vote in the
116th Congress despite encouragement from the legal community.154
The bill was recently re-introduced into the 117th Congress on July 28,
2021,155 and may experience increased support due to the Biden
administration’s outspoken stance against corruption.156
The enactment of the FEPA, however, would likely prevent any
amendments to be made to the FCPA, for the very reason that any
amendment expanding the reach of the FCPA would therefore become

150 See Press Release, Global Financial Integrity, Congress Urged to Include AntiCorruption Measures in Coronavirus Response Packages by Group of 10 NGOs (Apr. 9,
2020), https://gfintegrity.org/press-release/group-of-10-ngos-urge-congress-. . .calanti-corruption-measures-in-future-coronavirus-response-packages/
(emphasizing
the need to adopt, alongside three other anti-corruption initiatives, the Foreign
Extortion Prevention Act (H.R. 4140)).
151 Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, H.R. 4737, 117th Cong. (2021); see also Foreign
Extortion Prevention Act, H.R. 4140, 116th Cong. (2019).
152 H.R. 4737, § 2; see also H.R. 4140, § 2.
153 Foreign Extortion Prevention Act: All Actions Except Amendments H.R.4140 –
116th Congress (2019–2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/housebill/4140/all-actions-without-amendments.
154 It appears that H.R. 4140 was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security on Aug. 28, 2019, but has since died following its introduction
to the House of Representatives on Aug. 2, 2019. For a record of congressional actions
pertaining to this initial iteration, see Foreign Extortion Prevention Act: All Actions
Except Amendments H.R.4140 – 116th Congress (2019–2020), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4140/all-actions-withoutamendments.
155 Foreign Extortion Prevention Act: All Actions Except Amendments H.R.4737 –
117th Congress (2021–2022), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/housebill/4737/all-actions-without-amendments.
156 See UNITED STATES STRATEGY ON COUNTERING CORRUPTION, supra note 27; 2021
Memorandum on Establishing the Fight Against Corruption as a Core United States
National Security Interest, supra note 24.
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redundant in light of the FEPA.157 This is significant because the
enactment of the FEPA would leave a possible gap in the United States’
ability to prosecute economic extortion. Since the FEPA was introduced
to amend 18 U.S.C. § 201, the amendment itself would act to retain the
standards of 18 U.S.C. § 201, which require the intent to “influence any
official act.”158 This is a notably different standard than required under
the FCPA. As a result, the factual circumstances necessary for a
successful prosecution under the FCPA may be different than a
successful prosecution under the FEPA. Moreover, the FEPA may be too
broad in suggesting the criminalization of any and all acceptances of
illicit payment. The above codification of economic extortion within the
FCPA may be better situated to narrow this broadness and attract
support.
In his Note, Garen S. Marshall discusses the opposition to
recognizing economic extortion as a criminal offense, ultimately
concluding that there are other ways to achieve deterrence in this
context.159 Specifically, Marshall suggests that the criminalization of
economic extortion may lead to an increase in bribe-paying because U.S.
entities will have a defensive crutch to fall back on.160 This argument
holds merit if economic extortion would only be an affirmative defense
for the bribe-payor. Economic extortion as a criminal offense, however,
would allow the punishment and consequential deterrent to swing both
ways. U.S. companies would be deterred from paying anything that
represents a bribe for fear of FCPA prosecution, and foreign officials and
entities would be hesitant to solicit, demand, or accept illicit payment
for fear of U.S. indictment in violation of a newly recognized economic
extortion offense.
What’s more, if Congress were to amend the FCPA to include
economic extortion as a recognized criminal offense that reaches
foreign public officials, it would incentivize U.S. individuals and entities
to report on such corrupt transactions more readily without fear of
157 The FCPA targets bribery. The FEPA would target extortion. With the adoption
and enactment of the FEPA, Congress would likely be less inclined to amend the FCPA to
encompass economic extortion, as argued for in this Comment.
158 18 U.S.C. § 201(b); H.R. § 4737, § 2(2) (stating that extortion requires “(A) being
influenced in the performance of any official act [or] . . . (B) being induced to do or omit
to do any act in violation of the official duty or person . . . .”); see also Daniel T. Judge,
“Receiver Beware”: How the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act Could Change the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 2020 U. ILL. REV. ONLINE 152, 164 (2020).
159 Marshall, supra note 82, at 1303.
160 Id. at 1304 (“Rather than responding to solicitation of bribes by foreign officials
with resistance and disclosure to law enforcement, targeted companies may be more
likely to pay bribes, knowing that they can fall back on an economic extortion defense.”).
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prosecution because an illicit payment has yet to be made. In most
cases, any such reporting would yield no harm to the reporting U.S.
individual or entity because they would already be at an impasse in their
corporate negotiations. If anything, it would clarify yet another oft-cited
ambiguity within the enforcement powers of the FCPA.161
After all, a large purpose of the Resources Guide, as well as the
sporadic Advisory Opinions, is to clarify ambiguities present within the
FCPA. Peter R. Reilly discusses the inherent difficulty in incentivizing
corporate self-reporting; specifically, Reilly posits that the greatest
utility of an incentive will not exist unless and until the government
clarifies the “specific and calculable benefits that can be achieved
through self-reporting . . . .”162 Scholars have repeatedly criticized the
FCPA’s enforcement power because of its vagueness,163 which may deter
corporate entities from disclosing ambiguous transactions for fear of
garnering unwanted attention. An increase in Advisory Opinions, which
work to clarify the legality of questionable transactions, may be one way
to increase governmental transparency. Consequentially, an effort to
clarify the opaque prosecution process of the FCPA may indeed increase
instances of self-reporting.
Regardless of whether this suggestion is considered, the United
States could follow the example of other various States Parties to the
UNCAC by criminalizing both the acceptance of a bribe and the payment
of a bribe through the creation of new legislation. The United Kingdom
has gone farther than this Comment suggests by enacting the UK Bribery
Act in 2010.164 By all accounts, the UK Bribery Act is the most farreaching anti-corruption and anti-bribery law in a developed country.
For example, the UK Bribery Act broadly applies to any company,
regardless of its location, that “carries on a business or a part of a
business, in any part of the [UK].”165 Thus, any company that has any
business dealings in the UK could be held criminally liable under the Act,
even if the alleged bribe did not take place in the UK and even if the
161 See generally Steven R. Salbu, Redeeming Extraterritorial Bribery and Corruption
Laws, 54 AM. BUS. L. J. 641, 680 (2017) (discussing differing interpretations of FCPA
elements).
162 Peter R. Reilly, Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate Transnational Bribery
Worldwide: Federal Transparency and Voluntary Disclosure under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1683, 1683 (2015).
163 See, e.g., Salbu, Redeeming Extraterritorial Bribery and Corruption Laws, supra
note 161, at 658–60 (discussing the noted vagueness underlying whether a state-owned
or state-controlled entity is an instrumentality of a foreign government such that its
employees are foreign officials).
164 Bribery Act, 2010, c.23 (U.K.).
165 See id.
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benefit is intended to accrue to an individual or entity outside of the
UK.166
Notably, the UK Bribery Act holds corporate entities strictly liable
if they fail to prevent bribery.167 Although the UK Bribery Act provides
a potential defense if the corporate entity can show that “adequate
procedures were in place to prevent bribery,”168 this Comment is not
suggesting the FCPA, or any legislation, prosecute per a strict liability
standard. From a practical perspective, it would be nearly impossible to
facilitate the prosecution of a company that uses two degrees of
separation to bribe its way into a market, economy, or country. Instead,
this Comment suggests that Congress narrow and specify the avenues
available to prosecute foreign public officials and recognize economic
extortion as a criminal offense because the criminalization of economic
extortion would not as drastically alter business negotiations as would
a complete ban on accepting payments. If anything, this would simply
increase the formalities surrounding business negotiations and provide
further oversight into contexts in which money changes hands.
Lastly, expanding the whistle-blower reward system in order to
incentivize a higher volume of voluntary corporate reporting may be
effective—after all, the FCPA’s enforcement mechanism is a law based
on general deterrence.169 As to how the FCPA Whistleblower Provisions
and Protections should be effectively expanded, it is best left to the
experts.
V. CONCLUSION
Undeniably, the adoption and enactment of the FCPA has
benefitted the ever-growing international economy, from both a
financial integrity perspective and a political transparency perspective.
The FCPA, however, has not kept pace with international standards
pertaining to combatting transnational bribery in a technologicalfocused world. Bribery is a global problem and thus requires a global
solution. Developed nations—namely, the United States—have a moral
and legal duty to implement effective prevention and enforcement
measures against international corruption. Such nations can more
readily expose and prosecute foreign individuals and foreign entities.170
The FCPA should be amended—for what would be only a third time in

166
167
168
169
170

Id.
Id.
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6), (h)(1)(A).
See Heineman & Heimann, supra note 34, at 77.
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43 years—to recognize and criminalize economic extortion by foreign
public officials. This may indeed be the most efficient and most effective
way of curbing the demand for illicit payments. As long as there is a
demand for illicit payments, there will always be a supply of bribes.

